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Paper Abstract: Discusses U.S. economic & military support of Chiang Kai-Shek. Factors that contributed to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the Nationalist regime of Chiang in 1949. Growing tensions between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China. Korean War policy decisions. Historical background of Nationalist-Communist struggle. Paper Introduction: KOREA AND AMERICAN SUPPORT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK: SETTING THE PATTERN OF POST-1949 CHINESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT This research paper traces and analyzes the factors which contributed to the victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang) and to the worsening tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and the end of the Korean War. Many indigenous and exogenous factors influenced the outcome of the Chinese civil war of 1946-1949. The most important of these were the chaotic conditions which prevailed within China and the Japanese invasion and occupation of the mainland. The CCP achieved in the early postwar period decisive military and political superiority over a weakened and corrupt Nationalist Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. F. Hsiung, J. 218). OnJanuary 12, 195 , Acheson in a speech left Taiwan and South Korea outsidethe American 'defensive perimeter' in the Far East. . In order to confinethe war to Korea and to avoid direct hostilities between the PRC and theUnited States, Truman in late June 195 decided not to accept Chiang'soffer of troops for Korea; and he ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter theTaiwan Strait in order to prevent an attack on or from Taiwan. However, even as successive Japanese governmentsincreased their pressure on and depredations in China in the 193 s,American "policy continued to reflect the view that China was not importantenough to risk embroilment with Japan" (Tsou, 1963, p. Conclusion The United States extended economic and military support to theNationalist regime as part of its global strategy during World War II. Gaddis, J. Lewis, & X. The Americans, Chiang and the CCP (1937-1945) Ever since it had enunciated its Open Door policy at the turn of thecentury, the United States had supported the territorial and politicalintegrity of China and opposed diplomatically its dismemberment by Europeanpowers and Japan. W., J. an increase in civil strife,banditry and anarchy" and famine (Pelissier, 1963, p. . Pelissier, R. . . W. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press. TheSoviets, after invading Manchuria, turned large caches of captured weaponsover to the PLA. . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.----------------------- 13 KOREA AND AMERICAN SUPPORT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK: SETTING THE PATTERN OF POST-1949 CHINESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT This research paper traces and analyzes the factors which contributedto the victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over theNationalist (Kuomintang) regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang)and to the worsening tensions between the United States and the People'sRepublic of China (PRC) between 1949 and the end of the Korean War. the army had no mobility, no strength, noleadership" (p. xiv &xvi). Pre-War Nationalist-Communist Struggle The thirty year struggle (192 -1949) for power between theNationalists and the CCP was preceded by a long period of decay anddisintegration of the Manchu Dynasty which was ousted by the Revolution of1911. (1967). Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.Boston: Little, Brown. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. B. imperialists win [in Korea], they may get so dizzy withsuccess that they may threaten us" (p. In his speech of June 3 , 1949, Mao said that China "must lean to oneside" [toward the Soviet Union] with whom the PRC entered into a formalalliance (the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of February 195 ) (Chace,1998, p. Mao's military romanticism: China andthe Korean war, 195 -1963. Meanwhile, the war afforded the CCP under Mao Zhedong's inspiredleadership the opportunity to consolidate its control over northeasternChina, mobilize support among the peasantry and working class and play aleading role in liberating large sections of the countryside from Japaneserule. Morwood, W. References Chace, J. Sino-Americanrelations remained frozen for another 18 years --until the visits of HenryKissinger and President Nixon to Beijing in 1971-1972. White, T. Communist Victory in the Chinese Civil War The Japanese surrender produced a power vacuum in Manchuria andnorthern China, which the Communists were well-positioned to exploit. Nationalist China at war. Sino-American Relations (1949-195 ) After General George Marshall's last ditch (1945-1946) attempt tomediate a settlement failed, the American Government became disenchantedwith Chiang's chances for survival and sought to disengage itself from theimpending Communist triumph over Chiang's enfeebled forces. New York:W. 217). The United States provided substantial supportto the Nationalists during and after the end of the Sino-Japanese War of1937-1945 which it could not leverage to produce a political settlementwithin China and which earned it the intense hostility of the CCP. According to Spence (199 ), "the eruption of full-scale war withJapan . Meanwhile, China faceda mortal challenge, the seizure by Japan of Manchuria in 1931, of chunks ofnortheastern China in 1933-1936 and full-scale Japanese invasion after theIncident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing in July 1937. In 1937-1938,Japanese forces captured most of Eastern China, including all itsindustrial centers and its most fertile farmland. The awakening of China 1793/1949. As he explained, "theJapanese are an affliction of the skin, the Communists a disease of theheart" (Morwood, 198 , p. He said "people'sconfidence in the government declined precipitously as they sufferedprogressive disadvantages under the government's mismanagement of criticalprograms" (p. Uncertainpartners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean war. Chi, H. G. 1948-195 saw an intensification of the Cold War, including the 1948Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia, the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, the first Sovietatomic explosion in August 1949 and the wave of McCarthyism in the UnitedStates over internal security.The North Korean dictator, Kim Il Sung, obtained Stalin's permission inApril, 195 to launch an attack on South Korea which occurred with Sovietmilitary assistance on June 25, 195 . Duel for the Middle Kingdom. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press. In the 192 s, China suffered a "progressive collapseof both central and local government, . Prompted by reports that the PLA was putting up more effectiveresistance to the Japanese than the Nationalist Army, the Americans made adetermined effort in 1944-1945 to generate military cooperation and/or apolitical coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists. 26 ). 78).According to Zhang (1995), Mao told his Politburo on August 5, 195 that"if the U.S. According to Chi, "after 194 , it [the Kuomintang] must have becomeacutely aware that it was generally losing the race against the Communists,even as it managed to force a stalemate upon the Japanese" (p. The immediate impact of the Sino-American clash inKorea was a hardening of American attitudes toward the PRC, and vice-versa.The Americans came to regard the PRC as a threat to their interests in EastAsia and strengthened their military and economic ties with Chiang'sRepublic of China on Taiwan. New York: Macmillan. . 132). Goncharov, S. The CCP achieved in the early postwarperiod decisive military and political superiority over a weakened andcorrupt Nationalist state. . Itnever effectively came to terms with, and was unable to remedy, theinherent weaknesses of Chiang's failed state. According to Hsiung & Levine (1992), until 1944 the prevailing image of China in the United States . 13 ).Throughout the war, Chiang reserved some of his best troops (on the average2 of 9 divisions) for blockading the communist People's Liberation Army(PLA) in northern Shensi Province and other areas the PLA liberated fromthe Japanese (Crozier, 1976, pp. S. 237-238). (1993). 22).Tuchman (197 ) said "China was a problem for which there was noAmerican solution" (p. United States relations with China,with special reference to the period 1944-1948 Department of Statepublication 3573, Far Eastern Series 3 August, 1949. White (1946) describedthe Nationalist Army at the end of the war as "a tired, dispirited,unorganized mass, despised by the enemy, alien to its own people, neglectedand ridiculed by its allies . 218). Japanese atrocities suchas the Rape of Nanking and the rising tide of Japanese militarism in EastAsia generally led the American government to take steps to block furtherJapanese expansion in the Far East. The man who lost China. Sharpe. According to Kennan (196 ), "by the mid-Twenties, it [CCP]achieved a certain degree of ideological unity, but it remained weak andwithout mass support" (p. Acheson. After some success in quelling warlordsduring his Northern Expedition of 1926-1928, Chiang turned against theCommunists, few of whom survived massacres in Shanghai and Canton and aseries of punitive expeditions (193 -1934) which forced the survivors toundergo the hardships of the Long March (1934-1935). Mao understood,however, the risk of becoming involved because Stalin told Kim that "if youget kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. What was clear was thatboth sides profoundly distrusted each other. Even though hepromised to form a united front [with the Communists] against the Japaneseafter he was kidnapped by Marshal Chang Hsueh-ling in Sian in December1936, Chiang then and later made a much stronger effort to exterminate theCommunists than to defend China against Japan. 15). Levine (Eds.). (Ed.) (1967). Spence, J. 144-145). D. H., & A. According to Chi (1982), "the KMT [Kuomintang] was an extremelynarrowly based militaristic regime" characterized by "a top heavy politicalstructure in which leaders on the national level lost touch with thesocioeconomic aspirations of the masses" (pp. 135). Sun Yat-sen (Sun), revolutionary leader and founder of the KuomintangParty, was forced to acquiesce in the military dictatorship of General YuanShih-kai (1912-1916). I. He told the British Foreign Secretary ErnestBevin in April 1949 that the United States intended to recognize the PRCafter a suitable interval during which the dust would be allowed to settle.Under the so-called 'wedge' strategy then in vogue in American nationalsecurity circles, the hope was that Mao might become an Asian Tito.However, recognition proved to be impossible because of Congressionalhostility. The closure of the Burma Road and the logisticproblems of supplying China over the Hump (the Himalaya Mountains) limiteddirect American military support. The Americans provided airlift for Nationalist troops whoat first reasserted themselves in the north and a further $2 billion ineconomic and military aid between V-J Day and 1948 (Chace, 1998, p. (1982). (1992). China crosses the Yalu. Cut off from its principalsource of revenue, virtually all of its industries and its most fertilefarmland, Nationalist China during the war suffered from progressivelyworsening military and economic weakness and ineptitude, widespreadcorruption, hyperinflation and an increasingly narrow base of politicalsupport. He said recently revealed materials fromSoviet archives made it clear that Mao had no interest in amicablerelations with the United States in 1949-5 . American diplomats were frustrated bythe unwillingness or inability of the Kuomintang to undertake reforms tobroaden its base of internal support. Nevertheless, American Lend-Lease aid tothe Chinese Government during 1941-1945 was substantial -- approximately$1.5 billion (Chi, 1982, p. ended any chance that Chiang . 268). New York: G.P. Whatever opportunity mighthave existed for a reconciliation of the Nationalists and Communists wasirretrievably lost in 1944-1946. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press. After Sun's death, Chiang emerged as the leader ofthe Kuomintang. The United States wished to avoid Soviet or Chinese entry into thewar; however, General Douglas MacArthur's smashing victory at Inchon inSeptember 195 and the American policy decision to unify Korea by forceresulted in Mao's decision to intervene in force in late October 195 .According to Hastings (1987), Premier Zhou [Enlai] told Indian AmbassadorKavalan Panikkar that "if the United Nations crossed the 38th parallel,China would intervene in the war" (p. .was of a heroic ally struggling for freedom and democracy under the leadership of enlightened, Christian men and women. New York: Simon & Schuster. The Americans gambled on Chiang and lost. L. Jacoby. 437). The policy of the United States during World War II was to renderNationalist China such financial and military assistance as was needed tokeep China fighting. He said that Mao wasdisillusioned with the United States after the failure of the MarshallMission and "he seems to have convinced himself that the United States wasthe chief adversary of the Chinese Communist revolution and that he couldensure the success of that enterprise only by resisting the Americans" (p.63). W. New York: Simon & Schuster. The most important of these were thechaotic conditions which prevailed within China and the Japanese invasionand occupation of the mainland. (1946). 221; & Foreign Relations, 1949, May 24, pp. (196 ). was not to be trusted" (pp. In the civil war of 1945-1949, the PLAprevailed over Nationalist forces primarily because the Communist forceswere better organized, unified, motivated and led. . Leading American officialsregarded Zhou's threat as a bluff, a curiously purblind position in view ofKorea's historic role as a buffer between China and its enemies from thenorth, Russia and Japan. Kennan, G. You have to ask Mao forall of the help" (Goncharov et al., 1993, pp. Crozier, B. Whiting, A. The refusal of the Japanese to withdrawfrom China and America's retaliatory embargo on aviation gasoline exportsto Japan served as the casus belli for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 216).However, Nationalist troops rapidly became overextended and trapped insidecities which the PLA surrounded. Norton. New York:Macmillan. . Theirmutual enmity was further deepened by policy decisions taken by both thePRC and the United States in 1949-195 and in connection with the KoreanWar. 64). 237). Tsou, T. 531). Many indigenous and exogenous factors influenced the outcome of theChinese civil war of 1946-1949. E. The PRC and the United States nearly went towar over Chinese attacks on Quemoy and Matsu in 1955. (1997). hoped to have good relations with the United States" (p.219). . In the event the PRC sent four armies (nearly 3 , troops) overthe Yalu secretly in October. In its August1949 White Paper, the State Department declared that "a regime withoutfaith in itself an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle"and disclaimed any responsibility for the outcome: "nothing the UnitedStates did or could have done within the reasonable limits of itscapabilities could have changed the results" (Van Slyke, 1949, pp. America's failure in China 1941-195 . C., & S. The Trumanadministration resisted pressures from MacArthur and the China Lobby towiden the war to China. Nevertheless, theAmerican Government became disillusioned with China's contribution to thewar effort (which receded in importance as the American island hoppingcampaign in the Pacific succeeded) and with Chiang's resistance to Americanproposals for reform of his regime. Tsou (1963) said "America's relationswith China were more strained than those with any other ally" (p. 215). 53 ). (1998). Gaddis saidthat the latter decision "had a profound effect in Beijing," and that "Maoconcluded that he now faced a coordinated American offensive" (p. (198 ). Chinese Intervention in the Korean War In moves designed to reduce tensions in the region, President HarryTruman announced on January 5, 195 that the United States would notintercede to prevent a takeover of Taiwan by the PRC and a week earlier theNational Security Council advised the President that the United Statesshould not subsidize attempts by Chiang to regain power on the mainland(Chace, 1998, p. 63). Putnam's Sons. Mao was informed and approved;however, Whiting (196 ) said "there seems little ground for concluding thatChina anticipated direct involvement in the war" (p. Litai. Van Slyke, L. Ambassador PatrickHurley and the right wing China Lobby in the American Congress placed theblame on communist sympathizers within the State Department. . (1987). China's bitter victory.Armonk: M. (1995). The principalconsequences, apart from the 'loss' of China to the Communists was thefurther envenomization of Sino-American relations for an entire generation. According to Chace (1998), Secretary of State Dean Acheson wasenamored with the idea of exploiting possible tensions between the PRC andthe Soviet Union (p. . Oxford: Oxford University Press. According to Chace, Mao andZhou [Enlai] . (196 ). On the ordersof Soviet leader Josef Stalin, the CCP subordinated itself to theKuomintang which received substantial military aid, training and politicaladvice from the Soviets. President Franklin Roosevelt attempted toelevate China to the status of a postwar great power, one of the FourPolicemen (together with America, Britain and the Soviet Union) which wouldensure peace and stability in East Asia after the war. 337-341). We now know, rethinking coldwar history. New York: EverettHouse. W. 184). . The Kuomintang's abysmal mismanagement of the postwarChinese economy had catastrophic results. (1963). Zhang, S. There was a striking discrepancy between this public image and the deepening resentment that Chinese and American leaders already felt toward each other (p. Stilwell and the American experience in China,1911-1945. Opinionsthen and later as to why such efforts failed differed. (197 ). The Korean war. New York:Scribners. might have had of creating astrong and centralized government" (p. The Nationalists misgoverned China in partbecause of the impact of the war itself and due to its own inherentshortcomings. New York:William Sloane. Chace said "Congress was making it impossible for Acheson toabandon support of the Chinese Nationalists and move to a realist policy ofestablishing relations with Beijing" (p. (199 ). 91).Those relations reached crisis proportions during Fall, 1944 after theJapanese Ichigo offensive overran American airbases in southern China andChiang forced FDR to recall General Joseph Stilwell, who had unsuccessfullypressed military reforms on Chiang. Gaddis (1997) disagreed. Leftwingwriters, such as Morwood (198 ), said that Chiang's intransigence was themajor obstacle to progress. Tuchman, B. Thunder out of China. The search for modern China. Hastings, M. 342 & 328). (1976). He said "the Generalissimo was not interestedin peace in China through a democratic coalition government" and that Maoin particular came to distrust Hurley "as an imperialist and a reactionary,[who] . 3 & 29). The PRC ultimately suffered nearly onemillion casualties in Korea (Spence, 199 , p. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.