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Japan/U.S. Trade
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Analysis of US-Japan trade, including discussion of: Japanese economy, American concerns, Japanese economic, agricultural & rice trade, policies, US response to those policies, & indications of change.... More...
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Paper Abstract: Analysis of US-Japan trade, including discussion of: Japanese economy, American concerns, Japanese economic, agricultural & rice trade, policies, US response to those policies, & indications of change.
Paper Introduction:
Introduction
Japan is an important trading partner for the United States, but there are still problems because of the Japanese propensity for different forms of protectionism to keep out competitive goods. There are certain goods that Japan has a particular need for and that the Japanese cannot produce themselves in sufficient quantity, such as wood, highly prized in Japan for its decorative and constructive qualities but not produced domestically in any great quantity. Rice is a staple in Japan, and the Japanese consumes a good deal of rice each year without allowing much in the way of imports from other countries. It is believed that there is a market large enough to support imported rice to a greater degree than is presently
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The Japanese carried this further and warned American producers ofwheat, soybeans, and other crops that their Japanese customers might lookelsewhere if Japan was forced to open its market to U.S. It is believed that there is amarket large enough to support imported rice to a greater degree than ispresently allowed and that it might be possible to use trade sanctions orsome other means to force the Japanese to open their rice markets tooutside competition from the United States. Foodaccounts for an average of about 15 percent in the American household, butin Japan it is thirty percent in spite of the fact that the averageJapanese eats eight hundred fewer calories per day than the averageAmerican. L. (1992, August 18). MITI was formed in 1949 and played a major role in thefifties and sixties in formulating international trade policy for Japan andin assisting the development of domestic industry and protecting it fromforeign competition. rice exporters.As a result, the major U.S. The New York Times, C1.Schlossstein, S. Knopf.Dolan, R. and Japan,with the U.S. By U.S. Rice farmers dig in: To them, the land is sacred. Imports of rice pilaf and other productscontaining meat or fish doubled during the first four months of 1992 as didimports of rice flour for use in confectioneries. The rice ban has been losing ground in Japan more rapidly this year,and clearly American producers are hoping that it is lifted so they cantake advantage of what they see as a clearly defined market. More than 6 out of 1 held that Japan is unfairly restricting the sale of U.S. (Prestowitz, 1988, p. One method would be selectively opening U.S. The reform was to bethorough, and the Japanese economy was to be given a competitive economicstructure as quickly as possible. actions would threaten long-term U.S.-Japan relations. economy. The problem of the price of land isexacerbated by tax policies that discourage resale or development of land,which is the opposite of America's mortgage-interest deduction and otherincentives to build. 1 5-118. Green card. Time, pp. Changes inpatterns of production and consumption have also meant changes in the wayrice is allocated. The protection of the status quo extends to the level of direct salesto consumers. (199 ). The Japanese culture found a way to satisfy the West whileretaining its own style. Japanese consumers are more patient because they have lessinformation, an the Japanese press has until recently been timid aboutexploring the issue of expensive rice. (1991, March 18). should impose quotas on what wasto be exported to Japan as another form of protectionism no better thanwhat Japan was doing to keep out certain products (Schlossstein, 1984, pp.8 -81). Japan shuts U.S. E. The New Yorker, pp. Surveys are beginning to show that urbandwellers wold favor rice imports ("Against the Grain," 1993, A14).Conclusion It may turn out that the United States does not have to take anyextraordinary action at all to change the Japanese position and toeliminate the trade barriers to the important of rice. markets andborders as leverage for better trade treatment. All such efforts were atthe behest and under the guidance of the government authorities, and thiswas a key element in the way Japanese business culture developed. (1993, February 18). A sharp cut in the price suggests thatthe mood in the Party is optimistic and that its elected members see noparticular need to cater to the farmers. No other country's consumers pay a higherprice for this protectionism than Japan. Rice is a staple in Japan, and theJapanese consumes a good deal of rice each year without allowing much inthe way of imports from other countries. seeks new means to compete, many Americans share the sense that the nation is imperiled by Japan's strong economic performance and unfair trade practices. However, after World War II the West came to think of Japan as adeveloping country, and this attitude ignored the reality of the level thecountry had reached before the war when it was already one of the world'sleading industrial and military powers. and Japan, a difference that hasspawned both misunderstandings and confrontations over trade issues inrecent years: The crux of the situation is that the United States and Japan have fundamentally different understandings of the purposes and workings of a national economy. 7-9). Growth was rapid so that by 19 Japan's capitalindustries had reached a level of technology comparable to that of the West(Prestowitz, 1988, pp. The second step is for thegovernment to use that petition as the basis for an investigation. Small retail storesthat are not affiliated with a chain account for nearly 6 percent of allsales, while in the United States they account for only three percent.Here again Japan has sacrificed its welfare as a consuming society toprotect its producers (Fallows, 1989, pp. A stable price is thought to showthat the Party is subject to political fears. New York Times, D1, D16.Pollack, A. is more than twenty-five times larger ad endowed withall the natural resources Japan lacks. (1992, January 27). Prestowitz (1988) notes thedifferences in approach between the U.S. consumers some $8 billion a year, morethan $1,2 per family. Indeed, the United States has moreoften than not responded to a perception of Japanese leadership withprotectionist policies of her own. Japan also avoidedforeign investment and sought the technology of the West not to bewesternized but to maintain her autonomy and purity as a society. The lower-priced rice used for processing has beenshifted to the higher-priced market, and prices of lower-quality rice havemore than doubled for everyone. Los Angeles: University of California Press.----------------------- 22 6)By 1988, the U.S. Such an analysis is inkeeping with the types of forces that are now forcing a change. The letter predicted this result if the matterwas even discussed in talks between the two countries: . to relax its tough laws on legalimmigration to punish the Japanese by allowing more of their talentedcitizens to immigrate, creating a sort of "brain drain" that would benefitthe U.S. New Republic, pp. and hurt Japan. Because so much of Japan's usable land is tied up by inefficientfarms, the Japanese pay exorbitant prices for housing, and the averageJapanese home, which is about one-third smaller than the average Americanhome, costs about twice as much. Rice in Japan is grown on tiny little plotsthat together take up about half the nonmountainous land in the country,and it costs about six times as much to produce as American-grown rice andten times as much as from Thailand, the world's price leader in rice. Japan's approach to business can be identified from the firstencounter with Europeans. Many of these importscame from Thailand, though about one-quarter of the imports of rice flourcame from the United States. 8) Japan negotiated trade treaties so that foreigners were preventedfrom doing business in the interior of the country. Ithas become a reliable measure of the political confidence felt by thegoverning Liberal Democratic Party. It may even be that the protectionism itselfcontributed to the decline of the farming community, reducing incentive tofind new modes of production and determining the profit that could be maderather than encouraging market forces to do so. Japan: A country study. All suchefforts were at the behest and under the guidance of the governmentauthorities, and this was a key element in the way Japanese businessculture developed. (1967). Boston: Houghton Miflin.Fund, J. Manyconsumer groups in addition are aligned with agricultural cooperatives andconcern themselves not with fighting for cheaper prices but withprotectionism. Many are alreadyabandoning farming because of the difficulties. (1988). The terms of surrender included theoccupation of Japan by Allied military forces, assurances that Japan wouldnever again go to war, the restriction of the sovereignty of Japan to thefour main islands, and the surrender of Japan's colonial holdings. 3). Import rice? One of the leading organizations in Japan dedicated to controllingthe amount of foodstuffs imported from the United States is Zenchu, or theCentral Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. The politicking and lobbyingby Japan was effective, and in both 1986 and 1988 the U.S. The price paid to the riceproducers by the government is set by a government council each summer. The U.S. should retaliate by erecting barriers of its own. The fact that Japan has managed to create an industrialized nationfrom the rubble of war has been seen as a miracle, and Japan has beenscrutinized for policies and concept that can be seen as innovationsproducing a changed economic structure. wasmaking demands that the Japanese liberalize their beef and citrus imports.However, many saw the idea that the U.S. While thus attempting to limit the extent of foreign intrusion, Japan immediately launched an intensive and historic effort to catch up with the industry and technology of the west. This document embodiedconstitutional reforms as well as economic reforms, including agriculturalland redistribution, the reestablishment of trade unions, and severeproscriptions zaibatsu. has recentlystarted giving Japan greater attention in order to discern the managementstyles used in Japan and to emulate them to the greatest degree possible,and with the increase in Japanese investment in the U.S., along with theopening of a certain number of Japanese manufacturing companies in theU.S., primarily to produce Japanese cars. Many buyers have been willing to pay more to keep thefarmers from going out of business. 13) This has become a source of some tension between the U.S. The main competition today is from Thailand,and U.S. ReferencesAgainst the Grain. This system datesback to 1942, though it has become increasingly expensive since the mid-198 s. Instead, thateventuality will come about as the result of changes in consumption andproduction within Japan. The never-mentioned realityis that the price of rice is a political price which has nothing to do withformulas and that imports are probably inevitable. rice exhibition. The average farm in Japan is only 3.3 acres. Only 12 percent offarm households in Japan receive all their income from farming, and another12 percent get most of their income from farming while the remainder getmost of their income from other sources, such as jobs in factories andoffices. From1945 to 1947, there followed a period of demilitarization anddemocratization under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, theSupreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). New York: Basic Books.Sanger, D. Rice farmers in Japan are havingdifficulties even without an open market and even with governmentsubsidies. The Japanese announced that they would open theirmarket, but they also said it could not be done all at once. E. There is also the additional danger thaterecting such barriers would start a trade war of massive proportions. It stipulated a symbolic role for theemperor, guaranteed civil and human rights, and renounced war. It is also noted that such barriers rarely have thedesired effect in any case. . products in Japan, and a nearly equal proportion thought the U.S. 1-2). The authority of MITI gradually decreased as privateindustry and other ministries took more responsibility on themselves (Dolan& Worden, 199 , xxix). Japan also avoided foreigninvestment and sought the technology of the West not to be westernized butto maintain her autonomy and purity as a society. Japan is America's single most important commodity customer, butstill Japan is seen as having a closed market, especially with reference tocertain products. New York: Alfred A. Fallows (1989) further points out that all nations protect theirfarmers to some degree, and farm-support programs are often a sore pointamong industrialized powers. . In a poll conducted in 198 , 75percent of the respondents agreed that domestic farm production should beincreased whenever possible, and only 16 percent answered the way mostAmericans would, that it is better to consume imported products if they areless expensive than domestic ones. The union isconcerned about protecting Japan's self-sufficiency in food, alreadyimperilled with a 5 percent reliance on foreign supplies, of which theUnited States furnishes half (Schlossstein, 1984, p. The policy goal of SCAP was "reform," and the supremecommander was specifically ordered to assume "no obligation to maintainparticular standards of living in Japan." Economic recovery was not theprimary intent of the occupying forces (Yamamura, 196 , pp. It isreported by the Institute for International Economics that Washington'strade barriers already cost U.S. 37-39).Japanese Rice Policies Rice produced in Japan today costs seven times as much as riceharvested in the United States, yet Japan blatantly excludes imports ofAmerican rice by means of a maze of legal and regulatory barriers.American rice growers estimate that they could capture a minimum of $2billion of the Japanese market with little effort if Japan's importbarriers were lowered. The trend toward reducedproduction within Japan is likely to continue, leading inevitably toincreased demand from consumers to make up for the shortfall, a demand thatcan be satisfied by American producers. could reduce tariffs on materials from Japan'smost feared competitors (Fund, 1992, pp. 5 - 52.Yamamura, K. Rice Council's boothwith the excuse that displaying the handful of rice in the American boothviolated Japan's trade and food control laws (Choate, 199 , pp. Smolowe, J. The program was drastic--it was not theJapanese way to enforce competition, for instance (Yamamura, 196 , p. More and more young people arebecoming urbanized and are shunning rice production. Japan began from a position far behind theWest, with her infrastructure devastated by the war, and since has achieveda position of economic preeminence, challenging the United States and otherindustrialized nations for world leadership in innovation and industrialproduction, especially in high-tech industries of great import on theinternational scene today and into the future. Response to Japanese Policies Clearly, the response of U.S. Foreign experts were hired to come to Japanand transfer the technology and skills they had developed. The rice market within Japan is deteriorating in several ways,Rice producers have been selling their rice directly to the private marketrather than to the government as they are supposed to do. Some food processors have advocatedincreased imports to provide the rice they need, but other processors havenot advocated such a change, at least not in public. If Japan's rice subsidies arewhittled away, it will be with considerable resistance from farmers andconsumers alike. During that period, theJapanese concentrated on building an industrial base by means of thecontrol and intervention of the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI). Schlossstein (1984) points out: Until 197 , in fifty years of foreign trade, America had never run a merchandise trade deficit. (Prestowitz, 1988, p. Urban consumers are not tied to the mystical rice culture that hasso long prevailed and are becoming aware that they pay five times or morethan the rest of the world. farm organizations did not support the ricemillers, and the heads of the American Agricultural Movement, the NorthDakota Wheat Commission, and the colorado Wheat Administrative Committeepublicly opposed the rice millers' petition. Growthwas rapid so today Japan's capital industries have reached a level oftechnology comparable to that of the West (Prestowitz, 1988, 7-9).American Concerns One of the major reasons why many in the United States have beenlooking askance at Japanese trade policies is that the U.S. It was also stated that Japan was already a verystable market and the largest customer for U.S. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.Fallows, J. This was a country that had isolated itselfrigorously from the rest of the world, but Perry issued an order that Japanwould have to open her markets or face the consequences. TradeRepresentative refused to initiate an investigation into Japan's exclusionof American-grown rice. trade deficit was at $119.8 billion, actually down fromthe previous year's $152.1, and 44 percent of the deficit was with Japan.The public sees the issue as one of fairness, with Japan being unfair andthe U.S. Japan rebuilt after the war by using techniques that continueto be used today, though adapted to the changed circumstances on theinternational economic scene. Fund saysanother approach would be for the U.S. The riceprogram in Japan, on the other hand, was not even questioned until the mid-198 s, and Japanese consumer groups have generally defended the currentpolicy. More like us: Making America great again. The ban is also losingground politically as the ruling political party has been losing votes. Japannegotiated trade treaties so that foreigners were prevented from doingbusiness in the interior of the country. being victimized: As the U.S. farm products, other thanrice. Still another approach would be specifically toencourage professional women to immigrate to the U.S., as many Japanesewomen are frustrated at their unemancipated status in the business world.Fund further notes that the Japanese fear losing market share in the U.S.above all else, and the U.S. does not holdthe preeminent position she once did. Trading places. 11)At the same time, Japan's giant association of agricultural cooperatives,the nokyo, hired Washington lobbyists to fight the rice millers' petition.The nokyo also started a public relations campaign with the American pressand U.S. At that time, Japan's navyand army ministries were abolished, her munitions and military equipmentdestroyed, and her war industries converted to civilian uses. grave political problems would arise, and cause serious anxiety and confusion among the Japanese people. Such importation will startsmall and increase over time. In 1982, our merchandise trade deficit with Japan alone was more than $2 billion. The surrender of Japan to theUnited States after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 wasdescribed by the emperor as "enduring the unendurable and suffering what isinsufferable," but he asked the Japanese people to do just that when it wasclear that there was no other choice. the government also blocks the importation of all rice grownelsewhere and sets the domestic price for rice by paying farmers atartificially high levels while subsidizing customers. The Japanese government intervenedat a March 199 international food fair outside Tokyo and forced U.S.officials to remove the rice exhibited in the U.S. The American rice millers areprepared to provide the needed commodity as soon as Japan loosens thebarriers and allows increased importation. The government is clearly faced with the problemthat if it continues to protect its rice-growing industry, it may be facedwith the loss of part of its food processing industry to other nations. Some food processorsindeed state that Japanese consumers prefer the quality of Japanese riceand that they would not buy food products made with foreign rice. Even generousgovernment subsidies have not made it possible for many farmers to supportthemselves. The spokentruth is that the price of rice is determined each year by a formula thattries to equalize agricultural and industrial wages and that imports willnever be allowed to disrupt this arrangement. American rice producers have indeedstarted this process, and in 1986 and 1988 they filed a petition with theU.S. Nokyoprovides farmers with seeds, fertilizer, machinery, and credit and controlsmost of the 1 .5 million tons of rice that Japanese farmers produce eachyear. Such an approach wouldhave a good chance of working and would hurt fewer people, and it wouldalso avoid rewarding American companies who call for protection in the nameof "fair trade" but whose real goal is a less open market. (1991, October 14). New York: Congdon & Weed, Inc.Smith, Patrick. The organization sent a message to the ReaganAdministration that any discussion of rice trade would violate basiccultural sensitivities in Japan because rice farming played an intimaterole in Japanese culture. While Japanimports about half the food needed each day, if it were interested in priceit would import much more. This would changethe country forever, but it would not be the type of change the Westenvisioned. SCAP operated on the assumption that Japan would be subjected to aseries of "economic democratization" policies, and the initial intent wasto see to it that Japan did not enjoy a higher economic level than any ofthe neighboring Asiatic countries that had been threatened by Japaneseaggression. In most Western economies, crop-support programs, which are widespread, are also controversial, andconsumer groups complain that higher food prices hurt them. Trade Representative which documented the exclusion by Japan of riceimports. The number of farmhouseholds has dropped from more than 6 million in 196 to 3.8 milliontoday. The fact that Japan was now thinking the unthinkable was not lost onAmerican business people. While the United States embraces Adam Smith, the seventeenth-century prophet of free trade, and has concentrated on consumption as the main economic engine, Japan has focused on production and dominance of key industries that will enhance its strategic position. response, though he also states that calls for trade barriers inretaliation would only hurt U.S. Grainand soybeans accounted for two-thirds of this trade. In Japan, rice is a controlled commodity. Letter from Tokyo. Theproblems facing the Japanese government today make this scenario all butcertain within a short time. This should not blind the world tothe fact that there are certain elements in the success of Japan thatderive from Japan's history and that can be seen as continuous throughoutthis century, only to be revived and revitalized after the war and tocontribute today to maintaining the lead the nation has achieved in worldtrade. Many of the economicpolicies imposed during the transition period remained in force well intothe 197 s when they were rethought and changed to more economicallysupportive policies. There are certaingoods that Japan has a particular need for and that the Japanese cannotproduce themselves in sufficient quantity, such as wood, highly prized inJapan for its decorative and constructive qualities but not produceddomestically in any great quantity. 16-17.Pollack, A. The Japanese goal of insuring that the country is self-sufficient in its staple food seems to be diminishing as a possibility.The result within Japan is that it is likely the interests of thetraditional Japanese rice farmers will be pitted against the interests ofthe equally traditional sake brewers and makers of rice cakes. In one sense,the transition period was relatively short, accelerated by the Korean War,but Japan's transition in another sense was lengthy. Soon after this, leaders of Japan's ruling Democratic Party senta letter to President Reagan saying that U.S. In a poll conducted for Time [magazine] in early May by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 76% of those polled expressed the belief that Japan's economic success poses a threat to the U.S. Thethird step, beginning if the study finds that foreign protectionism doesexist, is for the government to negotiate the reduction of these tradebarriers or to retaliate if necessary. The Japanese have been protecting the little stores andthwarting the chains throughout Japan, and one government directive afteranother has made it harder to open discount stores, supermarkets, or otherlow-cost outlets that would improve the standard of living for the consumerwhile imperilling the tiny greengrocer down the block. Thesuccess of the Japanese strategy is apparent.Japanese Agricultural Trade Policy The protectionism that has marked much of Japanese economic policy isalso seen with reference specifically to Japanese agricultural tradepolicy. Economic policy in postwar Japan: Growth versus economic democracy. (1989, June 5). Inaddition, the political power of the ruling party has been reduced not onlyby changing economic circumstances but by a series of scandals that havethrown government policies into question as never before. Foreignerscould trade at one of two places, the small port of Shimoda or the smallfishing port of Hakodate in northern Japan: This was the first of what would become known in later years as "market-opening packages". The first step is for the U.S. One thing that has been happening is that companies thatare not allowed to import rice have been importing rice products instead,for these are not banned. The 1947 constitution would remain the document that directed thegrowth and operation of Japan. (1993, April 13). farm organizations. in 1982 Japan accounted for almost $6 billion of ourtotal agricultural exports of some $4 billion, and one out of every twentyacres in the United States was producing food and feed for Japan,representing more cropland than all of the cropland in Japan itself. Maintaining high price supports has become a disproportionatelylarge item in the national budget, and barring foreign-grown rice hasbecome an increasingly troublesome trade issue. (Choate, 199 , p. Since 1973, our cumulative deficit has reached over $3 billion. Price is not what drives the Japanese food market. Zaibatsu means literally "wealth group," and thesewere powerful financial or industrial combines that merged during the Meijiera and that were implicated in the militarist regimes of the thirties andforties (Dolan & Worden, 199 , p. The government regulatesthe amount of land that can be devoted to the cultivation of rice andoversees the distribution of the product in designated stores. producers will have to compete with Thailand for a share of theJapanese market as it opens wider and wider in the coming years. industry to file apetition documenting foreign protectionism. & Worden, R. The chancesof the elimination of the ban increase as the number of rice farmersdiminishes, likely to continue since more than one-third of the farmer'sare over 6 and new entrants to the field are few. Several Japanese companies are now operatingsake breweries in California, leading to speculation that American sakemight also be imported. At the market and currency exchange rate prevailingin 1988, the land in Japan was worth much more than the land in America,even though the U.S. As a further insult, Japan will not allow Americanrice to be shown to Japanese consumers. consumers and Japanese workers. Recently, the Japanese indicated that there might be an openingof Japan's rice market to imports, a move the government may be forced tomake as farmers stop farming and as the old supports no longer have thedesired effect. The government has only indicated the possibility of aslight opening in the rice market, but even a slight opening would be amajor shift in policy (Pollack, 1993). (1989). 16-17).Indications of Change For their part, the Japanese are also determining how to respond toany American move for change. Smith (1991) notes that the entire systemdemonstrates the two kinds of truth by which the Japanese live. V. Rice consumption per person has also been declining steadily as theJapanese diet has diversified, and livestock now surpasses rice as thenation's biggest agricultural product. trade representatives to Japaneseprotectionist policies has been ineffective when it is not outrightconciliatory, and over time this has only contributed to the perception ofunfairness and to the impetus for demands for U.S. seeing the Japanese government as offering excessivelyprotectionist policies to Japanese industry and business by excludingcompetition. protectionism inretaliation. The Japanese system served to protect the farmer when there was afarmer, but as Japan has been faced with the same sort of rural-urban shiftas the rest of the industrialized world, the rationale for thisprotectionism has changed. 11-12). When the transition came, the Japanese in essencereturned to the prewar period in terms of protectionist policies forJapanese companies, central control of the economy (now vested in thegovernment rather than in the zaibatsu system), and other elements designedto promote the interests of Japan over other economic entities. (199 ). Japan thinks the unthinkable. An examination of the tradingissues involved and the options open to the United States will be examinedto determine whether it is feasible to press this issue with the Japanese.The Japanese Economy The Japanese industrial expansion since World War II has beenconsiderable and has been noted by other industrialized nations around theworld as almost miraculous. 6 ). Underpressure from SCAP, the government sought to amend the 1889 MeijiConstitution, and on May 3, 1947 the new Japanese Constitution came intoforce, often called the "MacArthur Constitution". Policywas implemented on four major fronts--restriction of zaibatsu-connectedfirms, dissolution of holding companies, elimination of excessive economicpower, and the introduction of an anti-monopoly act. trade law, American rice producers cansecure federal help to pry open the Japanese market through the initiationof a three-step process. Wall Street Journal, A14.Choate, P. It is still seen asnot politically acceptable to call for imports. Trade sanctions are probably not going to be necessary given thestatements made recently by the Japanese, and American rice producers willfind a ready market in Japan at least for low-priced rice for processedfoods if not for higher-quality imports. The price dropped in 1989for the first time in 31 years. When the change willcome is another issue.U.S. Getting tough With Tokyo. Japanconcentrated in the postwar period on rebuilding her economy, attempting tocultivate friendly ties with all nations, and relying on the United Statesfor military security (Dolan & Worden, 199 , xxxii-xxxiii). Japan was opened to the West in 1853 whenAdmiral Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay and found a country still in a feudalstage of development. Fund (1992) expresses the growing dissatisfaction with theU.S. Itis believed that the political future is in the cities, not in rural areas,and yet these policies protect the rural regions and cost the cities moremoney. Fund indeed suggests a different course, asking that the UnitedStates creatively use its dynamic culture and economy to get the Japaneseto play fair. While the United States has encouraged and written into law adversarial relationships between business and government and labor and management, Japan has striven to achieve cooperation. 51)The question is whether the sorts of sanctions much of the public wouldsupport would be valuable in forcing Japan to change position with regardto the importation of rice or be a detriment to improved trade relations inthe future.Japanese Economic Policy Until about 1969, Japan after World War II had chronic trade deficitsas the Japanese imported more than they exported. (Smolowe, 1989, p. (1984). Trade War. Agents of influence. (Schlossstein, 1984, p. This would indeed seem to indicate thefoolishness of certain types of trade barriers and sanctions and shows thatnatural economic forces are more likely to have an effect than pressure oreven the sorts of policy "tricks" suggested above by Fund. Furthermore, we fear that, should this happen, the long-standing friendship between the United States and Japan may seriously be impaired. 82). New York Times.Prestowitz, C. The group is opposed toliberalization of beef and orange quotas and believes that the UnitedStates will flood Japan with cheap rice once agricultural quotas arerelaxed, thus putting Japanese rice farmers out of work. Still, the U.S. Pollack (1992) sees the change as coming aboutbecause of a rice shortage in Japan in spite of reduced consumption,showing clearly that rice production has been much reduced over what it wasin the past. Introduction Japan is an important trading partner for the United States, butthere are still problems because of the Japanese propensity for differentforms of protectionism to keep out competitive goods.
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