"GUNS OF AUGUST, THE" (BARBARA TUCHMAN).   Term Paper ID:18850 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Critical analysis of work on major events & actors of WWI.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Critical analysis of work on major events & actors of WWI. Paper Introduction: This study will provide a critical analysis of Barbara W. Tuchman's The Guns of August. The study will include a view on the genre of the book; a summary of its contents, focusing on specific questions central to the author's portrayal of the major events and actors of World War I; and a personal opinion on the worth of the book. Tuchman's book is an essentially historical study of World War I, but its power and lasting popularity are due to the excitement and immediacy the author brings to her work. She is meticulous with her footnoting, so that we have no doubt that she is in fact an historian and not a novelist, a "nonfiction novelist" or any other hybrid writer who includes fact and fiction in an inextricably intertwined conglomeration. As we read on the inside page of the back cover (in the Bantam Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. The outlook for France appeared tragic . The time for splendor was past.It did not shout 'Forward!' or summon men to glory. Tuchman emphasizes the prescience of Lord Kitchener on theWestern side, and Metternich on the German's side, with respect to accuratepredictions about the difficulties and possible longevity of the war. Each sidethought they would win the war in a short period of time, the leaders whothought otherwise being in the extreme minority. . As we read on theinside page of the back cover (in the Bantam paperback edition), Tuchmansaw herself as "a writer whose subject is history." In short, the book isan accurate portrait of the events leading up to World War I, concentratingon the August, 1914, Battle of the Marne, but it is told in such anengrossing way and with such penetrating insight and style that the readerdoes not feel that he is reading about irrelevant events which took placein a meaninglessly distant era involving beings whose fate is onlyacademically interesting. . . . Just as there were voices crying in the wilderness in 1914 withrespect to the horrors to come, there were also in 1991 similar voicescrying that the "kinder, gentler" war of American high-technology againstthe Iraqis would bring with it unpredictable horrors. The English, in their imprecise fashion,counted vaguely on victory, without specifying when, where, or how, withina matter of months" (143). A new plan was necessary. knew the campaign wascoming to a climax. . . All sides were relatively well-prepared for the war--but they wereprepared for the war in their blueprints, not the war that would actuallytake place. As Tuchman writes, with respect to the loss of the battle ofTannenburg, "In Russia the disaster did not penetrate the public mind atonce, being blotted out by a great victory won at the same time over theAustrians on the Galician front . The Russians failed to see that numbers alonecould not win a war. But who listened?Who wanted to listen? The two World Wars, Korea,Vietnam, Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, and now the Persian Gulf War--allhorribly bloody and death-ridden military involvements--took place a longway from the shores of the United States. TheKaiser in Germany refused to consider the likelihood of Great Britainentering the war, being misled by the "no commitment" posture of thegovernment of Great Britain. Tuchman'sThe Guns of August. Nothing went according to plan for either side. Survival was theimmediate aim . As Tuchman makes clear with respect to the French, the war wasalmost lost a number of times: "The French . But it could happen again, it did happen again, and it will likelyhappen again, because such wars seem to arise from within .man, from someflaw in the race perhaps, and no war seems horrible enough to break manfrom the belief that war will right what is wrong in the world. Works CitedTuchman, Barbara W. . . The Russian Second Army had ceased toexist, General Samsonov was dead, and of his five corps commanders two werecaptured and three cashiered for incompetence . The conclusion is not apretty one: the world seems to have learned nothing about the horrors ofwar in the three-quarters of a century since World War I. . Americans seem tobe particularly ignorant about history and politics and the harsh realityof war and its consequences. . Their second plan--the plan of August 25 to shift thecenter of gravity over to the left in an effort to halt the German rightwing--had failed . . Tuchman concludes her book (prior to theAfterward) with these words, reflecting first on the high ideals andprinciples and promises of glory which fueled the nations; thoughts of warbefore the reality of war struck: ". This study will provide a critical analysis of Barbara W. Whatever the arguments for or against the Persian Gulf War, for or againstthe bombing of Iraq, for or against the personalization of the war againstthe "Hitler-like" Saddam Hussein, it is now clear that the aftermath of thewar, the long-term consequences of the war, are far worse than any of theleaders of our powerful nation predicted and far worse than any of ourpatriotic victory-loving citizens could have dreamed. Perhaps this is because, since the Civil War,no war has been fought on American soil. . After the first thirtydays of war in 1914, there was a premonition that little glory lay ahead"(483). . TheUnited States came out of Vietnam angry and looking for trouble, and it hasfound it a number of times since--in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, Iran,Lebanon, Panama, Grenada--but none of these "skirmishes" truly "fixed" thedamage done to America by Vietnam. As we read, "Germany had not planned on the need to hold out forlong. The disillusion was powerful, but it was not permanent. The Guns of August. In short, few on either side foresaw how long and difficult the warwould be. The nation was simply in too great a state ofagitation and instability to perform as it might otherwise have performedin the war. Tuchman paints a picture of war that shows men to be operatingessentially in darkness with respect to the reality of war. Count Witte wasconvinced the war would ruin Russia, Rasputin that it would destroy theregime." When peace proposals were drawn up as a means whereby Russiamight get out of the war with minimal losses, Russia refused, or at leastfailed to agree at the highest levels on a definitive course of action,within the time frame covered by Tuchman: "Whether out of loyalty to theAllies and the Pact of London or fear of making terms with the Germans, orinsensibility to the lapping tide of Revolution or simple paralysis ofauthority, the Russians never accepted (the peace proposals). She is meticulous with her footnoting, sothat we have no doubt that she is in fact an historian and not a novelist,a "nonfiction novelist" or any other hybrid writer who includes fact andfiction in an inextricably intertwined conglomeration. One would think that the lessons of World War I would never have beenforgotten, particularly with respect to the effects of disillusionment, asTuchman writes: "When at last it was all over, the war had many diverseresults and one dominant one transcending all others: disillusion . Germany came out of World War I angry and lookingfor trouble, which, under Hitler, it finally found in World War II. . Perhaps thecoming of the "monster" Hitler allowed the world to forget the lessons ofWorld War I which Tuchman enunciates, just as the coming of the "monster"Saddam Hussein allowed the United States to forget the lessons of Vietnam.The wars against Hitler and Hussein gave war "a good name" again, so thatthe disillusioning experiences of World War I and Vietnam could beforgotten, canceled out, as if the lessons learned were merely ones havingto do with military determination. New York: Bantam, 1989.----------------------- 8 . There is a strange hope which accompanies the despair of a "great"war such as the First World War: "Men could not sustain a war of suchmagnitude and pain without hope--the hope that its very enormity wouldensure that it could never happen again and the hope that when somehow ithad been fought through to a resolution, the foundations of a better-ordered world would have been laid" (488). The book is an extremely valuable work, then, not merely be cause itshows us an important chunk of world history in accurate detail, but evenmore so because it is so relevant to our own time. Tuchman's book is, in that sense, a tragic warning thatwill likely not be heeded. As a result they lost eighty percent of their iron ore for theduration and almost lost the war. To the contrary, Tuchman has written a bookdepicting humanity at its worst and at its best--at its most human--and thereader will find it an easy matter to be thoroughly involved in thoseevents and personalities. World War I was an up-close andintimate war for its European participants, as Tuchman makes clear. This was a different result than what the Russians expected when thewar began: "In St. France and Great Britain did not have nearly the numbers the RussianArmy could boast, but they offered to the Russians their diligence inmeticulous planning for an attack from the West against the Germans. The comparison can be applied to the Soviet Union in a number ofinstances (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Poland), Great Britain(the Falklands) and many other nations, but the lesson is the same, alesson which leaders and the masses are slow to learn: war is a series ofhorrors, there are no real victors, and there are no guarantees as to thelong-term results. Tuchman's book is an essentially historical study of World War I, butits power and lasting popularity are due to the excitement and immediacythe author brings to her work. Neither side foresawthe horrors that were to come. In mountingchaos and dwindling ammunition their war effort went on" (345-346). . In fact, without attacks on both sides againstGermany, from Great Britain and France (and finally the United States,whose role is not,covered in this study) on the West and Russia on theEast, Germany would not have been defeated. Infact, as Tuchman notes, none of the participants--the victors of Russia,France and Great Britain, or the losers of Germany--foresaw a long war.All of them thought the war would be relatively short and that their ownside would emerge victorious. ." (448-449). Petersburg the question was not whether the Russianscould win but whether it would take them two months or three; pessimistswho suggested six months were considered defeatists" (142). Is itthat the world is aware of what war is and what horrors occur during andafter wars, is exceedingly aware, and that awareness is what is beingshunted aside in favor of the blissed-out celebrations of "victory" amidyellow ribbons and flags and countless versions of "The Star-SpangledBanner"? The excellent planning by the leaders of Great Britain,France, Russia and Germany was based on a short war, so that we can saythat the planning was hardly excellent at all, because accurate predictionsabout the length of a war are an integral part of that planning. The theme of the book ispainfully relevant when we consider the situation in the Middle East today. . Keeping in mind that the book focuses on a limited part of the FirstWorld War, it is fair to say that the first of the four nations to beconsidered here (Russia, England, France, and Germany), Russia, was not upto the task at hand. Even with that pincerstrategy, the Allies almost lost the war, so short-sighted was the overallplanning. The study will include a view on the genre of thebook; a summary of its contents, focusing on specific questions central tothe author's portrayal of the major events and actors of World War I; and apersonal opinion on the worth of the book. The French, gambling on a quick finish, risked no troops onwhat would have been a difficult defense of the Lorraine iron basin butallowed the Germans to take it on the theory that they would regain it withvictory. ."(489). If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.